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Abstract
We show a regret minimization algorithm for setting the reserve price in a sequence of second-price auctions,
under the assumption that all bids are independently drawn from the same unknown and arbitrary distribution. Our
algorithm is computationally efﬁcient, and achieves a regret of e O(
p
T) in a sequence of T auctions. This holds even
when the number of bidders is stochastic with a known distribution.
Index Terms
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a merchant selling items through e-Bay auctions. The sell price in each auction is the second-highest
bid, and the merchant knows the price at which the item was sold, but not the individual bids from the bidders
that participated in the auction. How can the merchant set a reserve price in order to optimize revenues? Similarly,
consider a publisher selling advertisement space through Ad Exchange (such as AdX) or Supply Side Platform
(such as Adsense), where advertisers bid for the advertisement slot and the price is the second-highest bid. With no
access to the number of bidders that participate in the auction, and knowing only the actual price that was charged,
how can the publisher set an optimal reserve price?
We abstract this scenario by considering the following problem: A seller is faced with repeated auctions, where
each auction has a (different) set of bidders, and each bidder draws bids from some ﬁxed unknown distribution
which is the same for all bidders. It is important to remark that we need not assume that the bidders indeed bid their
private value. Our assumption on the bidders symmetry, a priori, implies that if they bid using the same strategy,
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their bid distribution is identical.1 The sell price is the second-highest bid, and the seller’s goal is to maximize the
revenue by only relying on information regarding revenues on past auctions.
The issue of revenue maximization in second-price auctions has received a signiﬁcant attention in the economics
literature. The Revenue Equivalence theorem shows that truthful mechanisms2 that allocate identically have identical
revenue (see [15]). Myerson [14], for the case of monotone hazard rate distributions, characterized the optimal
revenue maximization truthful mechanism as a second-price auction with a seller’s reserve price, i.e., with a
minimum price disqualifying any bid below it.
In addition to their theoretical relevance, reserve prices are to a large extent the main mechanism through which
a seller can directly inﬂuence the auction revenue in today’s electronic markets. The examples of e-Bay, AdX and
Adsense are just a few in a large collection of such settings. The practical signiﬁcance of optimizing reserve prices
in sponsored search was reported in [16], where optimization produced a signiﬁcant impact on Yahoo!’s revenue.
We stress that unlike much of the mechanism design literature (e.g., [15]), we are not searching for the optimal
revenue maximization truthful mechanism. Rather, our goal is to maximize the seller’s revenue in a given, yet very
popular, mechanism of second-price auction with a reserve price. In our model, the seller has only information
about the auction price (and possibly about the number of bidders that participated in the auction). We assume all
buyers have the same unknown bid distribution, but we make no assumptions about this distribution, only that the
bids are from a bounded domain. In particular, we do not assume that the distribution has a monotone hazard rate,
a traditional assumption in the economics literature. The main modeling assumption we rely upon is that buyers
draw their value independently from the same distribution (i.e., bids are independent and identically distributed).
This is a reasonable assumption when the auction is open to a wide audience of potential buyers. In this case, it is
plausible that the seller’s strategy of choosing reserve prices has no inﬂuence on the distribution of bids.
A. Our results.
The focus of our work is on setting the reserve price in a second-price auction, in order to maximize the seller’s
revenue. Our main result is an online algorithm that optimizes the seller’s reserve price based only on the observation
of the seller’s actual revenue at each step. We show that after T steps (T repetitions of the auction) our algorithm
has a regret of only e O(
p
T). Namely, using our online algorithm the seller has an average revenue per auction
that differs from that of the optimal reserve price by at most e O(1=
p
T), assuming the value of any bid lies in a
bounded range interval.
Our algorithm is rather easy to explain and motivate at a high level. Let us start with a simple O(T2=3) regret
minimization algorithm, similar to [12]. The algorithm discretizes the range of reserve prices to (T1=3) price bins,
and uses some efﬁcient multi-armed bandit algorithm (e.g., [5]) over the bins. It is easy to see that lowering the
1For example, if we had considered a ﬁrst-price auction, then assuming that bidders use the same strategy to map their private value to a bid
would result in the same bid distribution.
2A mechanism is truthful if it is a dominant action for the bidders to bid their private value.
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optimal reserve price by  will result in an average loss of at most .3 This already shows that vanishing average
regret is achievable, speciﬁcally, a regret of O(T2=3). Our main objective is to improve over this basic algorithm
and achieve a regret of e O(
p
T).
An important observation to understand our algorithm is that by setting the reserve price low (say, zero) we
observe the second-highest bid, since this will be the price in the auction. Hence, with enough observations, we
can reconstruct the distribution of the second-highest bid. Given the assumption that the bidders’ bid distributions
are identical, we can recover the bid distribution of an individual bidder, and the distribution of the highest bid.
Clearly, a good approximation to this distribution results in a good approximation to the optimal reserve price.
Unfortunately, this simple method does not improve the regret, since a good approximation of the second-highest
bid distribution incurs a signiﬁcant loss in the exploration, and results in a regret of O(T2=3), similar to the regret
of the discretization approach.
Our main solution is to perform only a rough estimate of the second-highest bid distribution. Using this rough
estimate, we can set a better reserve price. In order to facilitate future exploration, it is important to set the new
reserve price to the lowest potentially optimal reserve price. The main beneﬁt is that our new reserve price has a
lower regret to the revenue of the optimal reserve price, and we can bound this improved regret. We continue in
this process, getting improved approximations to the optimal reserve price, and accumulating lower regret (per time
step) in each successive iteration, resulting in a total regret of e O(
p
T) for T time steps.
Our ability to reconstruct the bid distribution depends on our knowledge about the number of participating bidders
in the auction. Our simpler case involves a known number of bidders (Section II). We later extend the algorithm and
analysis to the case where there is stochasticity in the number of bidders through a known distribution (Section III).
In both cases we prove a regret bound of e O(
p
T). This bound is optimal up to logarithmic factors. In fact, simple
choices of the bid distribution exist that force any algorithm to have order
p
T regret, even when there are only
two bidders whose bids are revealed to the algorithm at the end of each auction.
B. Related work.
There is a vast literature in Algorithmic Game Theory on second price auctions, with sponsored search as a
motivating application. An important thread of research concerns the design of truthful mechanisms to maximize
the revenue in the worst case, and the derivation of competitive ratio bounds, see [10]. A recent related work [8]
discusses revenue maximization in a Bayesian setting. Their main result is a mechanism that achieves a constant
approximation ratio with respect to any prior distribution using a single sample. They also show that with additional
samples, the approximation ratio improves, and in some settings they even achieve a 1  approximation. In contrast,
we assume a ﬁxed but unknown prior distribution, and consider the rate at which we can approximate the optimal
reserve price. In our setting, as we mentioned before, achieving a 1    approximation, even for  = T 1=3, is
straightforward, and the main focus of this paper is to show that a rate of  = T 1=2 is attainable.
3Note that the setting is not symmetric, and increasing by  might lower the revenue signiﬁcantly, by disqualifying many attractive bids.
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Item pricing, which is related to regret minimization under partial observation [5], has also received signiﬁcant
attention. A speciﬁc related work is [12], where the effect of knowing the demand curve is studied. (The demand
curve is equivalent to the bid distribution.) The mechanism discussed in [12] is a posted price mechanism, and the
regret is computed in both stochastic and adversarial settings. In the stochastic setting they assume that the expected
revenue function is strictly concave, and use the UCB algorithm of [3] over discretized bid values to derive their
strategy. Again, we do not make such assumptions in our work.
The question of the identiﬁcation of the buyers’ utilities given the auction outcome has been studied in the
economics literature. The main goal is to recover in the limit the buyers’ private value distribution (i.e., the buyers’
utility function), given access to the resulting auction price (i.e., the auction outcome) and assuming that bidders
utilities are independent and identically distributed [1], [9]. It is well known in the economics literature that given
a bid distribution that has a monotone hazard rate, there is a unique reserve price maximizing the expected revenue
in a second-price auction, and this optimal price is independent of the number of bidders. As we do not make
the monotone hazard rate assumption, in our case the optimal price for each auction might depend on the actual
(varying) number of bidders. Because the seller does not observe the number of bidders before setting the reserve
price (Section III), we prove our results using the regret to the best reserve price, with respect to a known prior
over the number of bidders. As we just argued, depending on the bid distribution, this best reserve price need not
be the same as the optimal reserve price one could set when knowing the actual number of bidders in advance.
There have been some works [7], [11], [20] on optimizing the reserve price, concentrating on more involved
issues that arise in practice, such as discrete bids, nonstationary behavior, hidden bids, and more. While we are
deﬁnitely not the ﬁrst ones to consider approximating optimal reserve prices in a second-price auction, to the best
of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst work that derives formal and concrete convergence rates.
Finally, note that any algorithm for one-dimensional stochastic bandit optimization could potentially be applied to
solve our revenue maximization problem. Indeed, whenever a certain reserve price is chosen, the algorithm observes
a realization of the associated stochastic revenue. While many algorithms exist that guarantee low regret in this
setting, they all rely on speciﬁc assumptions on the function to optimize (in our case, the expected revenue function).
For example, [6] obtains a regret of order
p
T under smoothness and strong concavity. The authors of [2] achieve
a regret worse only by logarithmic factors without concavity, but assuming other conditions on the derivatives.
The work [21] shows a bound of the same order just assuming unimodality. The work [4] also obtains the same
asymptotics e O(
p
T) on the regret using a local Lipschitz condition. The approach developed in this paper avoids
making any assumption on the expected revenue function, such as Lipschitzness or bounded number of maxima.
Instead, it exploits the speciﬁc feedback model provided by the second-price auction in order gain information
about the optimum.
II. KNOWN NUMBER OF BIDDERS.
We ﬁrst show our results for the case where the number of bidders m is known and ﬁxed. In Section III we will
remove this assumption, and extend the results to the case when the number of bidders is a random variable with
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Fig. 1. The revenue function R for m = 5 bids of value B(1) = 0:7;B(2) = 0:5;B(3) = 0:35;B(4) = 0:24;B(5) = 0:05. For p 2

0;B(2)
the revenue is constant, R(p) = B(2). For p 2

B(2);B(1)
the revenue grows linearly, R(p) = p, For p 2

B(1);1

the revenue is null,
R(p) = 0.
a known distribution. Fortunately, most of the ideas of the algorithm can be explained and nicely analyzed in the
simpler case.
A. Preliminaries.
The auctioneer organizes an auction about an item to be sold. He collects m  2 bids B1;B2;:::;Bm which are
i.i.d. bounded random variables (for deﬁniteness, we let Bi 2 [0;1] for i = 1;:::;m) whose common cumulative
distribution function F is arbitrary and unknown. We let B(1);B(2);:::;B(m) denote the corresponding order
statistics B(1)  B(2)    B(m).
In this simpliﬁed setting, we consider a protocol in which a learning algorithm (or a “mechanism”) is setting
a reserve price (i.e., a minimal price) p 2 [0;1] for the auction. The algorithm then observes a revenue R(p) =
R(p; B1;:::;Bm) deﬁned as follows:
R(p) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
B(2) if p  B(2)
p if B(2) < p  B(1)
0 if p > B(1) .
In words, if the reserve price p is higher than the highest bid B(1), the item is not sold, and the auctioneer’s revenue
is zero; if p is lower than B(1) but higher than the second-highest bid B(2) then we sell at the reserve price p (i.e.,
the revenue is p); ﬁnally, if p is lower than B(2) we sell the item to the bidder who issued the highest bid B(1) at
the price of the second-highest bid B(2) (hence the revenue is B(2)). Figure II gives a pictorial illustration of the
revenue function R(p).
The expected revenue (p) = E[R(p)] is the expected value of the revenue gathered by the auctioneer when the
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algorithm plays price p, the expectation being over the bids B1;B2;:::Bm. Let
p = argmax
p2[0;1]
(p)
be the optimal price for the bid distribution F. We also write F2 to denote the cumulative distribution function of
B(2). We can write the expected revenue as
(p) = E

B(2)
+ E

p   B(2) B(2) < p  B(1)
P

B(2) < p  B(1)
  E

B(2) p > B(1)
P

p > B(1)
;
where the ﬁrst term is the baseline, the revenue of a second-price auction with no reserve price. The second term is
the gain due to the reserve price (increasing the revenue beyond the second-highest bid). The third term is the loss
due to the possibility that we will not sell (when the reserve price is higher than the highest bid). The following
fact streamlines the computation of (p). All proofs are given in the appendices.
Fact 1: With the notation introduced so far, we have
(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z p
0
F2(t)dt   p
 
F(p)
m
;
where the expectation E[] is over the m bids B1;B2;:::;Bm.
The algorithm interacts with its environment (the bidders) in a sequential fashion. At each time step t = 1;2;::: the
algorithm sets a price pt and receives revenue Rt(pt) = R(pt ; Bt;1;:::;Bt;m) which is a function of the random
bids Bt;1;:::;Bt;m at time t. The price pt depends on past revenues Rs(ps) for s < t, and therefore on past bids.
Given a sequence of reserve prices p1;:::;pT, we deﬁne the (cumulative) expected regret as
T X
t=1
 
E[Rt(p)]   Et[Rt(pt)]

=
T X
t=1
 
(p)   (pt)

; (1)
where the expectation Et = Et[ j p1;:::;pt 1] is over the random bids at time t, conditioned on all past prices
p1;:::;pt 1 (i.e., conditioned on the past history of the bidding process). This implies that the expected regret (1)
is indeed a random variable, as each pt depends on the past random revenues. Our goal is to devise an algorithm
whose regret after T steps is e O(
p
T) with high probability, and with as few assumptions as possible on F. We
see in the sequel that, when T is large, this goal can actually be achieved with no assumptions whatsoever on the
underlying distribution F. Moreover, in Appendix B we use a uniform convergence argument to show that the same
regret bound e O(
p
T) holds with high probability for the realized regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
 
Rt(p)   Rt(pt)

:
Note that here the realized revenue of the seller is compared against the best reserve price on each sequence of bid
realizations. Therefore, the realized regret is a much stronger notion of regret than the expected regret (1).
It is well known that from the distribution of any order statistics one can reconstruct the underlying distribution.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to the true distribution of order statistics, but only to an approximation
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thereof. We ﬁrst need to show that a small deviation in our approximation will have a small effect on our ﬁnal
result. The following preliminary lemma will be of great importance in our approximations. It shows that if we
have a small error in the approximation of F2(p) we can recover (p) with a small error. The function ()
therein maps (F())m to F2(). In fact, since the bids are independent with the same distribution, we have F2(p) =
m(F(p))m 1(1   F(p)) + (F(p))m = 
 
(F(p))m
. The main technical difﬁculty arises from the fact that the
function  1() we use in reconstructing
 
F()
m
from F2() —see pseudocode in Algorithm 1, is not a Lipschitz
function.
Lemma 1: Fix an integer m  2 and consider the function
(x) = mx
m 1
m   (m   1)x; x 2 [0;1] :
Then  1() exists in [0;1]. Moreover, if a 2 (0;1) and x 2 [0;1] are such that a     (x)  a +  for some
  0, then
 1(a)  
2
p
1   a
 x   1(a) +
2
p
1   a
: (2)
In a nutshell, this lemma shows how approximations in the value of () turn into approximations in the value
of  1(). Because the derivative of  1 is inﬁnite at 1, we cannot hope to get a good approximation unless a
is bounded away from 1. For this very reason, we need to make sure that our function approximations are only
applied to cases where the arguments are not too close to 1. The approximation parameter  in the pseudocode of
Algorithm 1 serves this purpose.
B. The algorithm.
Our algorithm works in stages, where the same price is consistently played during each stage. Stage 1 lasts T1
steps, during which the algorithm plays pt = b p1 for all t = 1;:::;T1. Stage 2 lasts T2 steps, during which the
algorithm plays pt = b p2 for all t = T1 + 1;:::;T1 + T2, and so on, up to S stages. Overall, the regret suffered by
this algorithm can be written as
S X
i=1
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti ;
where the sum is over the S stages. The length Ti of each stage will be set later on, as a function of the total
number of steps T. The reserve prices b p1; b p2;::: are set such that 0 = b p1  b p2    1. At the end of each stage
i, the algorithm computes a new estimate b i of the expected revenue function  in the interval [b pi;1], where p is
likely to lie. This estimate depends on the empirical cumulative distribution function b F2;i of F2 computed during
stage i in the interval [b pi;1]. The algorithm’s pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. The quantity C;i(p) therein is
deﬁned as
C;i(p) = p
s
2
 
1   b F2;i(p)

Ti
ln
6S

:
C;i(p) is a conﬁdence interval (at conﬁdence level 1   =(3S)) for the point estimate b i(p) in stage i, where
S = S(T) is either the total number of stages or an upper bound thereof.
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Algorithm 1: Regret Minimizer
Input: Conﬁdence level  2 (0;1], approximation parameter  2 (0;1];
Stage 1:
 For all t = 1;:::;T1, play pt = b p1 = 0 and observe revenues R1(0);:::;RT1(0);
 Compute, for x 2 [0;1], empirical distribution
b F2;1(x) =
1
T1
 


t = 1;:::;T1 : Rt(0)  x
	 
;
 Compute, for p 2 [0;1], approximation
b 1(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z p
0
b F2;1(t)dt   p 1 b F2;1(p)

:
For Stage i = 2;3;:::
 For all t = 1 +
Pi 1
j=1 Tj;:::;
Pi
j=1 Tj, play pt = b pi, and observe revenues R1(b pi);:::;RTi(b pi),
where b pi is computed as follows:
– Compute maximizer
b p
i 1 = argmax
p2[b pi 1;1]: b F2;i 1(p)1 
b i 1(p) ;
– Let Pi =
n
p 2 [b pi 1;1] : b i 1(p)  b i 1(b p
i 1)   2C;i 1(b p
i 1)   2C;i 1(p)
o
;
– Set b pi = minPi
Tn
p : b F2;i 1(p)  1   
o
;
 Compute, for x 2 [b pi;1], empirical distribution
b F2;i(x) =
1
Ti

 
n
t = 1;:::;Ti : Rt(b pi)  x
o
 ;
 Compute, for p 2 [b pi;1], approximation
b i(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z b pi
0
F2(t)dt +
Z p
b pi
b F2;i(t)dt   p 1 b F2;i(p)

:
Stage 1 is a seed stage, where the algorithm computes a ﬁrst approximation b 1 of . Since the algorithm plays
b p1 = 0, and R(0) = B(2), during this stage T1 independent realizations of the second-bid variable B(2) are
observed. Hence the empirical distribution b F2;1 in Algorithm 1 is a standard cumulative empirical distribution
function based on i.i.d. realizations of B(2). The approximation b 1 is based on the corresponding expected revenue
 contained in Fact 1, where () is the function deﬁned in Lemma 1, mapping (F(p))m to F2(p). Note that if
 1 is available, maximizing the above function (done in Stage 2) can easily be computed from the data. The
presence of the unknown constant E

B(2)
is not a problem for this computation.4 In Stage 2 (encompassing trials
4Note that in the algorithm (subsequent Stage 2) we either take the difference of two values b 1(p1)   b 1(p2), in which case the constant
cancels, or maximize over b 1(p), in which case the constant does not change the outcome.
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t = T1 + 1;:::;T1 + T2) the algorithm calculates the empirical maximizer
b p
1 = argmax
p2[0;1]: b F2;1(p)1 
b 1(p) ;
then computes the set of candidate optimal reserve prices
P2 =

p 2 [0;1] : b 1(p)  b 1(b p
1)   2C;1(b p
1)   2C;1(p)
	
;
and sets the reserve price b p2 to be the lowest one in P2, subject to the additional constraint that5 b F2;1(p)  1 .
Price b p2 is played during all trials within Stage 2. The corresponding revenues Rt(b p2), for t = 1;:::;T2, are
gathered and used to construct an empirical cumulative distribution b F2;2 and an approximate expected revenue
function b 2 to be used only in the subinterval6 [b p2;1].
In order to see why b F2;2 and b 2 are useful only on [b p2;1], observe that
R(b p2) =
8
> <
> :
b p2 or 0 if B(2) < b p2
B(2) if B(2)  b p2:
Thus, for any x  b p2 we have that
P(R(b p2)  x) = P(B(2)  x) :
Hence, if we denote by R1(b p2);:::;RT2(b p2) the revenues observed by the algorithm during Stage 2, the empirical
distribution function
b F2;2(x) =
1
T2


t = 1;:::;T2 : Rt(b p2)  x
	

approximates F2(x) only for x 2 [b p2;1].
All other stages i > 2 proceed similarly, each stage i relying on the existence of empirical estimates b F2;i 1,
b i 1, and b pi 1 delivered by the previous stage i   1. Figure II-B gives a pictorial explaination of the way the
algorithm works.
C. Regret analysis.
We start by showing that for all stages i the term 1   b F2;i(p) in the denominator of C;i(p) can be controlled
for all p such that (p) is bounded away from zero. Recall that S = S(T) denotes (an upper bound on) the total
number of stages.
Lemma 2: With the notation introduced so far, for any ﬁxed stage i,
1   b F2;i(p) 
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

holds with probability at least 1   =(3S), uniformly over p 2 [b pi;1], conditioned on all past stages.
5Note that the intersection is not empty, since b p
1 is in the intersection.
6Once again, computing the argmax of b 2 over [b p2;1] as well as the set of candidates P3 (done in the subsequent Stage 3) is not prevented
by the presence of the unknown constants E

B(2)
and
R b p2
0 F2(t)dt therein.
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Fig. 2. At the beginning of Stage i + 1, Algoritm 1 has at its disposal an estimate b i (here represented by the piecewise constant solid line)
of the actual expected revenue function  (the thick solid line). The upper horizontal dashed line indicates the estimate b i
 
b p
i

of the actual
maximum (p) (recall that b p
i is a maximizer of b i()). The lower horizontal dashed line indicates the lower end of the conﬁdence interval
for b i
 
b p
i

. This deﬁnes the next set Pi+1 of candidate optimal reserve prices, here marked by the thick solid line on the price axis, and the
next reserve price b pi+1, which is the lowest price in Pi+1. In this ﬁgure, b pi+1 = 0. Also, for simplicity, we have disregarded the further
constraint b F2;i(p)  1   .
In the sequel, we use Lemma 2 with p = p and assume that 1  b F2;i(p)   holds for each stage i with probability
at least 1   =(3S), where the approximation parameter  is deﬁned as
 =
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2mini Ti
ln
6S

provided p 2 [b pi;1]. In order to ensure that  > 0, it sufﬁces to have (p) > 0 and T large enough —see
Theorem 1 below. Recall that it is important to guarantee that b F2;i(p) be bounded away from 1 for all arguments
p which we happen to evaluate b F2;i at. This is because the function  1 has an inﬁnite derivative at 1.
The following lemma is crucial to control the regret of Algorithm 1. It states that the approximation in stage i
is accurate. In addition, it bounds the empirical regret in stage i, provided our current reserve price is lower than
the optimal reserve price. The proof is a probabilistic induction over stages.
Lemma 3: The event

(p)   b i(p)

  2C;i(p) for all p 2 [b pi;1] (3)
holds with probability at least 1   =3 simultaneously in all stages i = 1;:::;S. Moreover, the events
p  b pi
0  b i(b p
i)   b i(p)  2C;i(b p
i) + 2C;i(p)
(4)
both hold with probability at least 1    simultaneously in all stages i = 1;:::;S.
The next theorem proves our regret bound under the assumption that (p) is nonzero. Note that (p) = 0
corresponds to the degenerate case (p) = 0 for all p 2 [0;1]. Under the above assumption, the theorem
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states that when the horizon T is sufﬁciently large, then with high probability the regret of Algorithm 1 is
O
 p
T logloglogT(loglogT)

= e O
 p
T

. It is important to remark that in this bound there is no explicit
dependence on the number m of bidders.
Theorem 1: For any distribution F of the bids and any m  2 such that (p) > 0, we have that Algorithm 1
operating on any time horizon T such that
T >
1
(p)8

72ln
6(1 + log2 log2 T)

2
using stage lengths Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;:::,7 and approximation parameter   (p)2=12 has regret
O
 p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)
(p)
!
= e O
 p
T log1=
(p)
!
with probability at least 1   .
The proof of this theorem follows by applying at each stage i the uniform approximation delivered by Lemma 3 on
the accuracy of empirical to true regret. This would bound the regret in stage i by 8
q
1
Ti 1 ln 6S
 —see the proof
in Appendix A. We then set the length Ti of stage i as Ti = T1 2
 i
, i.e., T1 =
p
T;T2 = T3=4;T3 = T7=8;:::,
which implies that the total number of stages S is O(loglogT). Finally, we sum the regret over the stages to derive
the theorem.
D. Lower bounds.
The next result shows that the
p
T dependence of the regret on the time horizon T is not a consequence of our
partial information setting. Indeed, this dependence cannot be removed even if the mechanism is allowed to observe
the actual bids after setting the reserve price in each repetition of the auction.
Theorem 2: There exists a distribution of bids such that any deterministic algorithm operating with m = 2 bidders
is forced to have expected regret
T X
t=1

(p)   (pt)

= 

 p
T

:
Although the result is proven for deterministic algorithms, it can easily be extended to randomized algorithms
through a standard argument.
III. RANDOM NUMBER OF BIDDERS.
We now consider the case when the number of bidders m in each trial is a random variable M distributed
according to a known discrete distribution Q over f2;3;4;:::g. The assumption that Q is known is realistic: one
can think of estimating it from historical data that might be provided by the auctioneer. On each trial, the value
M = m is randomly generated according to Q, and the auctioneer collects m bids B1;B2;:::;Bm. For given m,
7For simplicity, we have disregarded rounding effects in the computation of the integer stage lengths Ti.
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these bids are i.i.d. bounded random variables B 2 [0;1] with unknown cumulative distribution F, which is the
setting considered in Section II. For simplicity, we assume that M is independent of the random variables Bi. For
ﬁxed M = m, we denote by B
(1)
m  B
(2)
m    B
(m)
m the corresponding order statistics.
Our learning algorithm is the same as before: In each time step, the algorithm is requested to set reserve price
p 2 [0;1] and, for the given realization of M = m, only observes the value of the revenue function Rm(p) =
R(p;B1;B2;:::;Bm) deﬁned as
Rm(p) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
B
(2)
m if p  B
(2)
m
p if B
(2)
m < p  B
(1)
m
0 if p > B
(1)
m ,
without knowing the speciﬁc value of m that generated this revenue. Namely, after playing price p the algorithm is
observing an independent realization of the random variable RM(p). The expected revenue (p) is now
(p) = EME

RM(p)

=
1 X
m=2
Q(m)E

Rm(p)

M = m

;
where the inner expectation E[ j M = m] is over the random bids B1;B2;:::;Bm.
Again, we want to minimize the expected regret with respect to the optimal reserve price
p = argmax
p2[0;1]
(p)
for the bid distribution F, averaged over the distribution Q over the number of bidders M, where the expected
regret over T time steps is
T X
t=1
 
(p)   (pt)

;
and pt is the price set by the algorithm at time t. In Appendix B we show that the same regret bound holds for
the realized regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
 
R
Mt
t (p)   R
Mt
t (pt)

where Mt is the number of bidders at time t.
Let F2;m denote the cumulative distribution function of B
(2)
m . We use EM

F2;M

(x) to denote the mixture
distribution
P1
m=2 Q(m)F2;m(x). Likewise,
EM

FM
(x) =
1 X
m=2
Q(m)
 
F(x)
m
:
Relying on Fact 1, one can easily see that
(p) = EME

B
(2)
M

+
Z p
0
EM

F2;M

(t)dt
  pEM

FM
(p) :
(5)
As in Section II, our goal is to devise an online algorithm whose expected regret is of the order
p
T, with as few
assumptions as possible on F and Q.
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We ﬁrst extend Lemma 1 to handle this more general setting.8
Lemma 4: Let T be the probability generating function of M,
T(x) =
1 X
m=2
Q(m)xm ;
and deﬁne the auxiliary function
A(x) = T(x) + (1   x)T0(x)
where, for both functions, we let the argument x range in [0,1]. Then T and A are bijective mappings from [0,1]
onto [0,1] and both T 1 and A 1 exist in [0,1]. Moreover, letting a 2 (0;1), and 0   < 1 a, if x is such that
a     A(T 1(x))  a + 
then
T(A 1(a))  
E[M]
1   (a + )
 x  T(A 1(a)) +
E[M]
1   (a + )
: (6)
In addition, if 9
(T00(x))2 (1   x) + T0(x)T00(x)  T0(x)T000(x)(1   x) (7)
holds for all x 2 [0;1] then, for any a 2 (0;1) and   0,
T(A 1(a))  

1   a
 x  T(A 1(a)) +

1   a
: (8)
Observe that T() and A() in this lemma have been deﬁned in such a way that10
EM[F2;M](p) = A(F(p))
and
EM[FM](p) = T(F(p)) :
Hence, EM[FM](p) in (5) satisﬁes
EM[FM](p) = T

A 1 
EM[F2;M](p)

:
In particular, when P(M = m) = 1 as in Section II, we obtain T(x) = xm and A(x) = mxm 1   (m   1)xm.
Thus, in this case A
 
T 1()

is the function () deﬁned in Lemma 1, and the reconstruction function  1() we
used throughout Section II is T
 
A 1()

. Because this is a more general setting then the one in Section II, we do
still have the technical issue of insuring that the argument of this recostruction function is not too close to 1.
8More precisely, in dealing with a more general setting we only obtain a slightly looser result than Lemma 1.
9Condition (7) is a bit hard to interpret: It is equivalent to the convexity of the function T(A 1(x)) for x 2 [0;1] (see the proof of Lemma 4
in Appendix A), and it can be shown to be satisﬁed by many standard parametric families of discrete distributions Q, e.g., Uniform, Binomial,
Poisson, Geometric. There are, however, examples where this condition does not hold. For instance, the distribution Q, where Q(2) = 0:4,
Q(8) = 0:6, and Q(m) = 0 for any m 6= 2;8 does not satisfy (7) for x = 0:6, i.e., it yields a function T(A 1(x)) which is not convex on
x = 0:6.
10Recall from Section II-A that, for any ﬁxed M = m, we have F2;m(p) = m(F(p))m 1(1   F(p)) + (F(p))m.
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As in the ﬁxed m case, the algorithm proceeds in stages. In each stage i the algorithm samples the function
EM[F2;M] by sampling RM(p) at appropriate values of p. This allows it to build an empirical distribution b F2;i
and to reconstruct the two unknown functions EM[F2;M] and EM[FM] occurring in (5) over an interval of reserve
prices that is likely to contain p. Whereas EM[F2;M] is handled directly, the reconstruction of EM[FM] requires
us to step through the functions T and A according to the following scheme:
b F2;i(p)  EM[F2;M](p) = A(F(p))
() A 1(b F2;i(p))  F(p)
() T
 
A 1(b F2;i(p))

 T(F(p)) = EM[FM](p) :
Namely, in stage i we sample EM[F2;M] to obtain the empirical distribution b F2;i, and then estimate EM[FM] in (5)
through T(A 1(b F2;i())).
In order to emphasize that the role played by the composite function A(T 1()) here is the very same as the
function () in Section II, we overload the notation and deﬁne in this section (x) = A(T 1(x)), where T and
A are given in Lemma 4. Moreover, we deﬁne for brevity  F2(x) = EM[F2;M](x).
With this notation in hand, the detailed description of the algorithm becomes very similar to the one in Sec-
tion II-B. Hence, in what follows we only emphasize the differences, which are essentially due to the modiﬁed
conﬁdence interval delivered by Lemma 4, as compared to Lemma 1.
In particular, if we rely on (6), the new conﬁdence interval size for Stage i depends on the empirical distribution
b F2;i through the quantity (we again overload the notation)
C;i(p) =
pE[M]
1   b F2;i(p)  
q
1
2Ti ln 6S

r
2
Ti
ln
6S

;
with
Ti >
1
2(1   b F2;i(p))2 ln
6S

:
Similarly, if we rely on (8), we have instead
C;i(p) =
p
1   b F2;i(p)
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

:
The resulting pseudocode is the same as in Algorithm 1, where the observations Rt(b pi) therein have to be interpreted
as distributed i.i.d. as RM(b pi), and E[B(2)] and F2 in b i are replaced by their M-average counterparts EME

B
(2)
M

and  F2. We call the resulting algorithm the Generalized Algorithm 1.
As for the analysis, Lemma 2 is replaced by the following (because of notation overloading, the statement is the
same as that of Lemma 2, but the involved quantities are different, and so is the proof in the appendix).
Lemma 5: With the notation introduced at the beginning of this section, if S = S(T) is (an upper bound on) the
total number of stages, we have that, for any ﬁxed stage i,
1   b F2;i(p) 
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

holds with probability at least 1   =(3S), uniformly over p 2 [b pi;1], conditioned on all past stages.
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Then an easy adaptation of Lemma 3 leads to the following expected regret bound. The proof is very similar to
the proof of Theorem 1, and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 3: With the notation introduced at the beginning of this section, for any pair of distributions F and Q
such that (p) > 0 we have that the Generalized Algorithm 1 operating on any time horizon T satisfying
T >
1
(p)8

288ln
6(1 + log2 log2 T)

2
with stage lengths Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;:::, and approximation parameter   (p)2=12 has regret
A
(p)2  O
p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)

=
A
(p)2  ~ O
p
T log1=

with probability at least 1   , where A = E[M] if (6) holds and A = 1 if (8) holds.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION.
Optimizing the reserve price in a second-price auction is an important theoretical and practical concern. We
introduced a regret minimization algorithm to optimize the reserve price incurring a regret of only e O(
p
T). We
showed the result both for the case where the number of bidders is known, and for the case where the number of
bidders is drawn from a known distribution. The former assumption, of known ﬁxed number of bidders, is applicable
when the number of bidders is given as the outcome of the auction. The assumption that the distribution over the
number of bidders is known is rather realistic, even in the case where the number of participating bidders is not
given explicitly. For example, one can hope to estimate such data from historical data that might be made available
from the auctioneer.
Our optimization of the reserve prices depends only on observable outcomes of the auction. Speciﬁcally, we
need only observe the seller’s actual revenue at each step. This is important in many applications, such as e-Bay,
AdX or AdSense, where the auctioneer is a different entity from the seller, and provides the seller with only a
limited amount of information regarding the actual auction. It is also important that we make no assumptions about
the distribution of the bidder’s bid (or its relationship to the bidder’s valuation) since many such assumptions are
violated in reality. The only assumption that we do make is that the distributions of the bidders are identical. This
assumption is a fairly good approximation of reality in many cases where the seller conducts a large number of
auctions and bidders rarely participate in a large number of them.
The resulting algorithm is very simple at a high level, and potentially attractive to implement in practice.
Conceptually, we would like to estimate the optimal reserve price. The main issue is that if we simply exploit
the current best estimate, we might miss essential exploration. This is why, instead of playing the current best
estimate, the algorithm plays a minimal -optimal reserve price, where  shrinks over time. The importance of
playing the minimal near-optimal reserve price is that it allows for efﬁcient exploration of the prices, due to the
speciﬁc feedback model provided by the second-price auction setting.
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An interesting direction for extending our results is the generalized second price auction model, when multiple
items of different quality are sold at each step. Here the problem of estimating the expected revenue function
becomes more involved due to the presence of terms that depend on the correlation of order statistics.
A different open issue, of more technical nature, is whether the inverse dependence on (p) in Theorem 1 (and
on (p)2 in Theorem 3) can somehow be removed. Indeed, these factors do not seem to be inherent to the problem
itself, but only to the kind of algorithms we use.
APPENDIX A
MAIN PROOFS.
Proof of Fact 1: By deﬁnition of R(p) we can write
(p) =
Z 1
p
xdF2(x) + pP
 
B(2) < p  B(1)
: (9)
By applying the identity E[X] =
R
P(X > x)dx to the nonnegative random variable B(2) IfB(2)>pg we obtain
Z 1
p
xdF2(x) = p
 
1   F2(p)

+
Z 1
p
 
1   F2(x)

dx
= p   pF2(p) + E

B(2)
 
Z p
0
 
1   F2(x)

dx
= E

B(2)
  pF2(p) +
Z p
0
F2(t)dt :
Moreover,
F2(p) = m(F(p))m 1  
1   F(p)

+ (F(p))m
and
P
 
B(2) < p  B(1)
= m
 
1   F(p)

(F(p))m 1 :
Substituting the above into (9) and simplifying concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1: A simple derivative argument shows that the function () is a strictly increasing and concave
mapping from [0;1] onto [0;1]. Hence its inverse  1() exists and is strictly increasing and convex on [0;1]. From
our assumptions we immediately have: (i) x   1(a + ) for any  2 [0;1   a], and (ii)  1(a   )  x for any
 2 [0;a]. In turn, because of the convexity of  1(), we have
 1(a + )   1(a) +
1    1(a)
1   a
; 8 2 [0;1   a] : (10)
Similarly, by the convexity and the monotonicity of  1() we can write
 1(a   )   1(a)  
d 1(x)
dx

 
x=a

  1(a)  
1    1(a)
1   a
; 8 2 [0;a] : (11)
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At this point, we need the following technical claim.
Claim 1:
1    1(a)  2
p
1   a; 8a 2 [0;1] :
Proof of Claim: Note that the case a 2 [0;3=4) holds trivially since 2
p
1   a  1, and therefore we need to
consider only a 2 [3=4;1]. Introduce the auxiliary function f(a) = 1   2
p
1   a. The claim is proven by showing
that (f(a))  a for all a 2 [3=4;1]. We prove the claim by showing that (f(a)) is a concave function of
a 2 [3=4;1], and that
d(f(a))
da


a=1  1, while (f(1)) = 1. We have
d(f(a))
da
=  2(m   1)
1   (f(a)) 1=m
1   f(a)
:
Hence, using L’Hopital’s rule,
d(f(a))
da
 
a=1 =
2(m   1)
m
 1
since m  2. Moreover,
d2(f(a))
da2 =  

m   1
m

(f(a)) 
m+1
m 
1
1   a
+
m   1
2

(f(a)) 1=m   1
(1   a)3=2
which is nonpositive if and only if m((f(a)) 1=m   1)  (1   f(a))(f(a)) 
m+1
m holds for any a 2 [3=4;1].
Since f(a) ranges in [0;1] when a 2 [3=4;1], after some simpliﬁcations, one can see that the above inequality is
equivalent to
(m + 1)x  mx
m+1
m + 1; 8x 2 [0;1] :
In turn, this inequality can be seen to hold by showing via a simple derivative argument that the function g(x) =
mx
m+1
m + 1 is convex and increasing for x 2 [0;1], while g(0) = 1 > 0 and g0(1) = m + 1. 
The claim together with (10) and (11) allows us to conclude the proof of Lemma 1. Speciﬁcally, the second
inequality in (2) is obtained by (10) and extended to any   0 just by observing that, by the claim, for  > 1   a
the right-most side of (2) is larger than 1. Moreover, the ﬁrst inequality in (2) is obtained by (11) and extended to
any   0 by observing that for  > a the left-most side of (2) is smaller than  1(a)   2a p
1 a  a   2a p
1 a  0
for any a 2 [0;1], where we have used the fact that  1(a)  a. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let B
(1)
k and B
(2)
k denote the maximum and the second-maximum of k i.i.d. bids B1;:::;Bk.
Set for brevity A = P
 
B
(1)
m > p

. Then we have
A  2P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p

and
A  2P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

+ P
 
B1 > p

 3P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

:
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Hence
1   F2(p) = P
 
B(2)
m > p

 P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

 P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p


A
3

A
2
:
In turn, A  (p), since each time all the bids are less than p the revenue is zero. Therefore we have obtained that
1   F2(p) 
2(p)
6
holds for all p 2 [0;1]. Finally, since b F2;i is the empirical version of F2 based on the observed revenues during stage
i (see Section II-C), the classical Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [13] implies that with probability
at least 1   =3S, conditioned on all past stages,
max
p2[b pi;1]

b F2;i(p)   F2(p)

 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

:

Proof of Lemma 3: We start by proving (3). Fix any stage i and write

(p)   b i(p)

 


 
Z p
0
F2(t)dt  
Z p
0
b F2;i(t)dt


 
+ p

 (F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)

 

Z p
0
 F2(t)   b F2;i(t)
 dt
+ p

 (F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)

 
 p max
t2[0;p]
 F2(t)   b F2;i(t)
  (12)
+ p


(F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)


 :
The DKW inequality implies that
p max
t2[0;p]

F2(t)   b F2;i(t)

  p
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

 C;i(p) (13)
holds with probability at least 1   =(3S). As for the second term in (12) we apply again the DKW inequality in
combination with Lemma 1 with x = (F(p))m =  1 
F2(p)

, a = b F2;i(p), and  =
q
1
2Ti ln 6S
 . This yields
p
 
 1 
F2(p)

   1 b F2;i(p)
 
  C;i(p)
with the same probability of at least 1   =(3S). Putting together and using the union bound over the S stages
gives (3).
We prove (4) by induction on i = 1;:::;S. We ﬁrst show that the base case i = 1 holds with probability at least
1   =S. Then we show that if (4) holds for i   1, then it holds for i with probability at least 1   =S over all
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random events in stage i. Therefore, using a union bound over i = 1;:::;S we get that (4) holds simultaneously
for all i with probability at least 1   .
For the base case i = 1 note that b 1(p)  b 1(b p
1) holds with probability at least 1   =(3S) because we are
assuming (Lemma 2) that b F2(p)  1    holds with the same probability, and so b p
1 maximizes b 1 over a range
that with probability at least 1   =(3S) contains p. Moreover, using (3) we obtain
(p)   b 1(p)  2C;1(p)
and
b 1(b p
1)   (b p
1)  2C;1(b p
1) :
Since (b p
1)   (p)  0 by deﬁnition of p, we obtain
0  b 1(b p
1)   b 1(p)  2C;1(b p
1) + 2C;1(p) ;
as required. Finally, p  b p1 trivially holds because b p1 = 0.
We now prove (4) for i > 1 using the inductive assumption p  b pi 1 and
0  b i 1(b p
i 1)   b i 1(p)  2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 2C;i 1(p) :
The inductive assumption and b F2;i(p)  1    directly imply p 2 Pi
Tn
p : b F2;i 1(p)  1   
o
(recall the
deﬁnition of the set of candidate prices Pi given in Algorithm 1). Thus we have p  b pi and b i(b p
i)  b i(p),
because b p
i maximizes b i over a range that contains p. The rest of the proof closely follows that of (4) for the
base case i = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1: If S = S(T) is the total number of stages, then the regret of our algorithm is
 
(p)   (b p0)

T1 +
S X
i=2
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti
 T1 +
S X
i=2
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti : (14)
For all stages i > 1 the following chain on inequalities jointly hold with probability at least 1    uniformly over
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i = 2;:::;S,
(p)   (b pi)
 (p)   b i 1(b pi) + 2C;i 1(b pi)
(by (3) —note that b pi  b pi 1)
 (p)   b i 1
 
b p
i 1

+ 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(since b pi 2 Pi)
 (p)   b i 1(p) + 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(since b i 1(b p
i 1)  b i 1(p) —see (4))
 2C;i 1(p) + 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(by p  b pi combined with (3))
 8
s
1
Ti 1
ln
6S

;
where in the last step we used the fact that b F2;i 1(p)  1  holds by Lemma 2, and that b F2;i 1(p)  1  for
p = b pi and p = b p
i 1 by the very deﬁnitions of b pi and b p
i 1, respectively. Substituting back into (14) we see that
with probability at least 1    the regret of our algorithm is at most
T1 + 8
S X
i=2
Ti
s
1
Ti 1
ln
6S

:
Our setting Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;::: implies that S is upper bounded by the minimum integer n such that
n X
i=1
T1 2
 i
 T :
Since i  log2 log2 T makes Ti  T
2 , then S  d2 log2 log2 Te = O(loglogT). Moreover, observe that Ti =
T1 2
 i
is equivalent to T1 =
p
T and Ti p
Ti 1
=
p
T, for i > 1. We therefore have the upper bound
(14) 
p
T + 8
p
T S
r
1

ln
6S

:
If (p) > 0 and
min
i
Ti = T1 =
p
T 
72ln(6S=)
(p)4
then   (p)2=12, and the above is of order
p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)
(p)
;
as claimed. 
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Proof of Lemma 4: We start by observing that T(0) = A(0) = 0, T(1) = A(1) = 1, T0(x)  0 for x 2 [0;1],
and A0(x) = (1 x)T00(x)  0 when x 2 [0;1]. Hence both T(x) and A(x) are strictly increasing mappings from
[0,1] onto [0,1], and so are T 1(x), A 1(x) and A(T 1(x)). Hence our assumptions on x can be rewritten as
T(A 1(a   ))  x  T(A 1(a + )) :
Moreover, since T() and A() are both C1(0;1), so is T(A 1()). Let  < 1   a. We can write
T(A 1(a + )) = T(A 1(a)) + 
dT(A 1(x))
dx


 
x=
for some  2 (a;a + ), where
dT(A 1(x))
dx
=
T0(y)
A0(y)
=
T0(y)
(1   y)T00(y)
and we set for brevity y = A 1(x) 2 [0;1]. Now, for any y 2 [0;1],
T0(y)
T00(y)
=
y
P
m2 mQ(m)ym 2
P
m2 m(m   1)Q(m)ym 2  y  1 :
As a consequence, since A 1 is a nondecreasing function, we can write
dT(A 1(x))
dx
 


x=

1
1   A 1(a + )

1
1   T 1(a + )
; (15)
the last inequality deriving from11 A(x)  T(x) for all x 2 [0;1]. Finally, from the convexity of T we have
T(x)  T(1) + (x   1)T0(1) = 1 + (x   1)E[M]. Thus T 1(x)  1   1 x
E[M], x 2 [0;1], which we plug back into
(15) to see that
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=

E[M]
1   (a + )
:
Replacing backwards, this yields the second inequality of (6).
To prove the ﬁrst inequality of (6), we start off showing it to hold for  < minfa;1   ag, and then extend it to
 < 1   a. Set  < a. Then proceeding as above we can see that, for some  2 (a   ;a),
T(A 1(a)) = T(A 1(a   )) + 
dT(A 1(x))
dx
 


x=
 T(A 1(a   )) +

1   T 1(a)
 T(A 1(a   )) +
E[M]
1   a
 T(A 1(a   )) +
E[M]
1   (a + )
;
11Whereas the function A() is, in general, neither convex nor concave, T() is a convex lower bound on A().
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the last inequality requiring also  < 1   a. If now  satisﬁes a   < 1   a (assuming a < 1=2) then the ﬁrst
inequality of (6) is trivially fulﬁlled. In fact,
T(A 1(a))  
E[M]
1   (a + )
 A(A 1(a))  
aE[M]
1   2a
= a

1  
E[M]
1   2a

< 0
since E[M]  2. This concludes the proof of (6).
In order to prove (8), we set for brevity y = A 1(x), and using the rules of differentiating inverse functions, we
see that
d2 T(A 1(x))
dx2 =
1
(1   y)2 T00(y)
+
T0(y)
(1   y)3 (T00(y))2
 
T0(y)T000(y)
(1   y)2 (T00(y))3 :
Thus d
2
dx2T(A 1(x))  0 for x 2 [0;1] is equivalent to
(T00(y))2 (1   y) + T0(y)T00(y)
 T0(y)T000(y)(1   y); 8x 2 [0;1]:
Since y ranges over [0,1] when x does, (7) is actually equivalent to the convexity of T(A 1(x)) on x 2 [0;1].
Under the above convexity assumption, we can write, for   1   a,
T(A 1(a + ))  T(A 1(a)) +
1   T(A 1(a))
1   a

 T(A 1(a)) +

1   a
:
On the other hand, if  > 1   a the above inequality vacuously holds, since the right-hand side is larger than one,
while T(A 1(x))  1 for any x 2 [0;1]. This proves the second inequality in (8). Similarly, by the convexity and
the monotonicity of T(A 1()) we can write, for all  2 [0;a],
T(A 1(a   ))  T(A 1(a))  
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=a

 T(A 1(a))  
1   T(A 1(a))
1   a

 T(A 1(a))  

1   a
which gives the ﬁrst inequality in (8). We extend the above to any   0 by simply observing that  > a implies
that T(A 1(a))   
1 a < a   a
1 a < 0, where T(A 1(a))  a follows from the convexity of T(A 1()). This
makes (8) trivially fulﬁlled. 
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Proof of Lemma 5: Let B
(1)
m and B
(2)
m denote the highest and the second-highest of m i.i.d. bids B1;:::;Bm.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that, for any m  2
P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p


1
2
P
 
B(1)
m > p

and
P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p


1
3
P
 
B(1)
m > p

:
Moreover,
1   F2(p)
= EM
h
P
 
B
(2)
M > p

M
i
 EM
h
P
 
B
(1)
bM=2c > p

M

 P
 
B
(1)
dM=2e > p

M
i

1
6
EM

P
 
B
(1)
M > p

M
2

1
6

EM
h
P
 
B
(1)
M > p

M
i2

1
6
2(p)
the second-last inequality being Jensen’s, and the last one deriving from IfB
(1)
m >pg  Rm(p) for all m  2 and
p 2 [0;1]. We then conclude as in the proof of Lemma 2 by applying DKW on the uniform convergence of b F2;i
to  F2. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider a setting with two bidders (m = 2) where both bids B1;B2 are revealed at the end
of each auction, irrespective of the chosen reserve price. Note that a lower bound in this setting implies a lower
bound in the harder setting of Theorem 1, in which only the revenue is revealed.
Consider bid distributions of the form
P
 
B = 1
2

= 1
2 +  and P
 
B = 3
4

= 1
2    :
Since the bid distribution is supported on
1
2; 3
4
	
, the expected revenue of a reserve price 0 < p < 1
2 is never
greater than that of p = 1
2. Similarly, the expected revenue of a reserve price 1
2 < p < 3
4 is never greater than that
of p = 3
4. Therefore, without loss of generality we may restrict our attention to strategies that select their prices
from
1
2; 3
4
	
.
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We now compute the expected revenue of p = 1
2 and p = 3
4,

 1
2

=
1
2

1
2
+ 
2
+ 2 
1
2

1
4
  2

+
3
4

1
2
  
2
=

3
4
2
 
1
4
 +
1
4
2

 3
4

= 2 
3
4

1
4
  2

+
3
4

1
2
  
2
=

3
4
2
 
3
4
  
3
4
2 :
Therefore

 1
2

  
 3
4

=

2
+ 2 : (16)
For any ﬁxed  2
 
0; 1
4

, consider now the random variable Z 2 f 1;+1g such that P(Z = +1) = P(Z =  1) = 1
2
and let P be the expected revenue function of the bid distribution
P(B = a) =
8
<
:
1
2 + Z if a = 1
2
1
2   Z if a = 3
4.
We now prove that no deterministic mechanism can have small regret on both conditional bid distributions P( j
Z = +1) and P( j Z =  1)
According to (16),
P
 1
2 j Z = +1

= P
 3
4 j Z = +1

+

2
+ 2 :
Moreover, switching  to   gives
P
 3
4 j Z =  1

= P
 1
2 j Z =  1

+

2
  2 :
Since  is chosen of the order of T 1=2, in the rest of the proof we may ignore the term 2 appearing in the
expected revenue function P. This adds a constant to the regret, which is taken into account by the asymptotic
notation. Now let p = p(Z) be the optimal reserve price for the conditional bid distribution. That is, p = 1
2 if
Z = +1 and p = 3
4 if Z =  1.
Fix any deterministic algorithm choosing reserve prices p1;p2;::: . Let T1=2 and T3=4 be the number of times
pt = 1
2 and pt = 3
4, respectively. Finally, let T be the number of times pt = p. Because the regret increases by

2 every time pt 6= p (recall that we are ignoring the 2 term in P), the expected regret of the algorithm with
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respect to the worst-case choice of Z is
max
z2f 1;+1g
T X
t=1
E

(p)   (pt) j Z = z


T X
t=1
E

(p)   (pt)

=

2
 
T   E[T]

=

2

T  
1
2

E[T1=2 j Z = +1] + E[T3=4 j Z =  1]

:
In this simpliﬁed setting, where the mechanism can observe the individual bids, each pt is determined by the
independent bid pairs
 
B
(1)
1 ;B
(2)
1

;:::;
 
B
(1)
T ;B
(2)
T

. Let P
+
T and P
 
T be the joint distributions of the bid pairs
when Z = +1 and Z =  1, respectively. Finally, let PT = 1
2
 
P
+
T + P
 
T

. Then, Pinsker’s inequality implies
P
+
T
 
pt = 1
2

 PT
 
pt = 1
2

+
r
1
2
KL
 
PTkP
+
T

 PT
 
pt = 1
2

+
r
1
4
KL
 
P
 
T kP
+
T

;
where we used the convexity of the relative entropy KL
 
kP
+
T

in the last step.
We now recognize that P
+
T and P
 
T are product distributions of T pairs of (shifted and scaled) independent
Bernoulli random variables B1
2+ and B1
2 , with parameters 1
2 +  and 1
2   , respectively. Therefore, taking the
scaling factor into account and using the chain rule for relative entropy gives
KL
 
P
 
T kP
+
T

 KL
 
P
 
T 1kP
+
T 1

+ 2KL

B1
2 kB1
2+

 2T KL

B1
2 kB1
2+

 322T
the last inequality holding if  2

0;0:47

. Hence
E[T1=2 j Z = +1]  E[T1=2] + T
q
1
4  322T = E[T1=2] + T 3=2p
8 :
Similarly,
E[T3=4 j Z =  1]  E[T3=4] + T 3=2p
8 :
Therefore
1
2

E[T1=2 j Z = +1] + E[T3=4 j Z =  1]


1
2
 
E[T1=2] + E[T3=4]

+ T 3=2p
8
=
T
2
+ T 3=2p
8 :
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This implies
T X
t=1
E

(p)   (pt)



2

T  
T
2
  T 3=2p
8

:
Choosing  = 
 
T 1=2
concludes the proof of the theorem.

APPENDIX B
BOUNDING THE REALIZED REGRET.
In this appendix, we show how to bound in probability the realized regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (p)  
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (pt)
suffered by the Generalized Algorithm 1. We need the following deﬁnitions and results from empirical process
theory —see, e.g., [19]. Let F be a set of [0;1]-valued functions deﬁned on a common domain X. We say that F
shatters a sequence x1;:::;xn 2 X if there exists r1;:::;rn 2 R such that for each (a1;:::;an) 2 f0;1gn there
exists f 2 F for which f(xi) > ri iff ai = 1 for all i = 1;:::;n. The pseudo-dimension [17] of F, which is
deﬁned as the length of the longest sequence shattered by F, controls the rate of uniform convergence of means
to expectations in F. This is established by the following known lemma, which combines Dudley’s entropy bound
with a bound on the metric entropy of F in terms of the pseudo-dimension —see, e.g., [18], [19].
Lemma 6: Let X1;X2;::: be i.i.d. random variables deﬁned on a common probability space and taking values
in X. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that, for any ﬁxed T and ,
sup
f2F
 

 
T X
t=1
f(Xt)   T E[f]
 

 
 C
r
dT ln
1

with probability at least 1   , where d is the pseudo-dimension of F.
Recall that EME

RM(p)

= (p) for all p 2 [0;1]. Let R =

RM(p) : p 2 [0;1]
	
be the class of revenue
functions indexed by reserve prices p 2 [0;1]. Hence, for each p, RM(p) is a [0;1]-valued function of the number
M of bidders and the bids B1;:::;BM.
Lemma 7: The pseudo-dimension of the class R is 2.
Proof: Since the revenue RM(p) is determined by B
(1)
M and B
(2)
M only, we use the notation Rp(b1;b2) to denote
the revenue RM(p) when B
(1)
M = b1 and B
(2)
M = b2. Since b1  b2, in order to compute the pseudo-dimension of F
we have to determine the largest number of points shattered in the region S = f(b1;b2) : 0  b2  b1  1g  R2
where the functions Rp are deﬁned as
Rp(b1;b2) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
b2 if b2  p
p if b2 < p  b1
0 if b1 < p .
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Note that each function Rp deﬁnes an axis-parallel rectangle with corners (p;p), (p;0), (1;p) and (1;0). Inside the
rectangle Rp = p, to the left of the rectangle Rp = 0, and points (b1;b2) 2 S above it satisfy Rp(b1;b2) = b2.
We now show that F shatters any two points x1 = (b1;b2) and x2 = (b1 + ;b2 + ) in the region S such
that  > 0 and b2 +  < b1. This is shown by the following case analysis where we use the values r1 = b2 and
r2 = b2 + .
 p > b1 + , this realizes the pattern (0;0) because Rp(x1) = 0  b2 and Rp(x2) = 0  b2 + ;
 b1 < p < b1 + , this realizes the pattern (0;1) because Rp(x1) = 0  b2 and Rp(x2) = p > b2 + ;
 b2 +  < p < b1, this realizes the pattern (1;1) because Rp(x1) = p > b2 and Rp(x2) = p > b2 + ;
 b2 < p < b2 + , this realizes the pattern (1;0) because Rp(x1) = p > b2 and Rp(x2) = b2 + .
In order to prove that F can not shatter any three points in S, arrange on the real line the six coordinate values
of these three points. These six numbers deﬁne seven intervals. When p ranges within any such interval, the value
of Rp must remain constant on all the three points. This is because the value of Rp(b1;b2) changes only when p
crosses b1 or b2. But then, F can only realize at most seven of the eight patterns needed to shatter the three points.
Theorem 4: Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, the actual regret of Generalized Algorithm 1 satisﬁes
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (p)  
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (pt)
=
A
(p)2  e O
 r
T log
1

!
with probability at least 1   , where A = E[M] if (6) holds and A = 1 if (8) holds.
Proof: For the sake of brevity, let Rt(p) denote R
Mt
t (p). Also, let Et[] be the conditional expectation
Et[jp1;:::;pt 1], i.e., the expectation of the random variable at argument conditioned on all past bids and all
past number of bidders. Let p
T be the random variable deﬁned as
p
T = argmax
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
Rt(p) :
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Then
T X
t=1
Rt(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Rt(pt)
=
T X
t=1
Rt(p
T)   T(p
T)
+
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

 
T X
t=1
Rt(pt)
+ T(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

 max
p2[0;1]
 
T X
t=1
Rt(p)   T(p)
!
(17)
+
T X
t=1

Et

Rt(pt)

  Rt(pt)

(18)
+ T(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

: (19)
In order to bound (17) we combine Lemma 6 with Lemma 7. This gives
max
p2[0;1]
 
T X
t=1
Rt(p)   T(p)
!
 C
r
2T ln
1

with probability at least 1   , where C is the constant mentioned in Lemma 6.
In order to bound (18), note that Zt = Et

Rt(pt)

 Rt(pt) for t = 1;2;::: is a martingale difference sequence
with bounded increments, Et[Zt] = 0 with Zt 2 [ 1;1] for each t. Therefore, the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality for
martingales establishes that
T X
t=1

Et

Rt(pt)

  Rt(pt)


r
2T ln
1

with probability at least 1   .
Finally, term (19) is bounded via Theorem 3 after observing that (p
T)  (p), where p = argmaxp2[0;1] (p)
is the maximizer of the expected revenue. This concludes the proof.
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